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Abstract
In this essay, I analyze the three most prominent views
regarding the philosophy of perception- direct realism, indirect
realism, and ideal realism. I consider two relevant problems
of perception, specifically the existence of hallucinations and
perceptual relativity, and to what extent they are problematic
for these views on perception. I first argue that direct realism,
the view typically referred to as ‘common-sense realism’, is
in fact far from common-sense. Although direct realists hold
the common-sense view that we directly perceive physical
objects, they are forced to hold the absurd view that we do
not know what physical objects look, smell, taste, sound, or
feel like. Further, they can never know if their perceptions
are ontologically mind dependent or not. I then argue that
although indirect realism is supposed to bypass the epistemic
problems of perception bogging the direct realist down, its
epistemic issues are at least as severe. Worse, an indirect realist
cannot explain how an unperceived physical object could
produce sensible qualities, and as such suffers from mindbody epistemic problems. I then argue that ideal realism, the
view that physical objects cannot exist unperceived, is the most
consistent and least problematic view regarding the philosophy
of perception. I conclude that we should accept ideal realism as
probably true on the basis of epistemic reasons alone.
Introduction
The primary focus of the philosophy of perception
is to understand the ontological nature of what it is that we
perceive by sense. There are three main views regarding what
the ontological nature of sense experience is, being direct
realism, indirect realism, and ideal realism. Direct realism is
the view that “perception is an immediate or direct awareness
of mind-independent physical objects or events in the external
world.” The term ‘mind-independent physical objects’ is
synonymous with ‘material objects’. The traditional proponent
of direct realism was Thomas Reid. Indirect realism is the view
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that perception is an immediate or direct awareness of minddependent non-physical representations of mind-independent
physical objects, and mediate or indirect awareness of mindindependent physical objects or events in the physical world.
The term ‘mind-dependent non-physical representations
of mind-independent physical objects’ is synonymous with
‘sense data’. The traditional proponents of indirect realism
were Rene Descartes, and John Locke. Ideal realism is the
view that perception is an immediate or direct awareness of
mind-dependent physical objects or events. For an ideal realist,
physical objects cannot exist unperceived, and the term ‘minddependent physical objects’ is synonymous with ‘sensations’.
The most notable ideal realist was Bishop George Berkeley.
In this essay, I argue that ideal realism is the most
consistent view regarding the philosophy of perception. I
begin by defining ‘perceived by sense’, and consequently
provide other important definitions. I proceed to argue that
direct realism, if true, commits its holders to radical epistemic
skepticism. I then argue that indirect realism if true commits
its holders to radical epistemic skepticism. Lastly, I argue that
ideal realism is more epistemically consistent than direct and
indirect realis. I conclude that we should accept ideal realism as
probably right.
Definitions
I understand whatever that is perceived by sense as
properly perceived by sense, or proper objects of the senses,
following Aristotle and George Berkeley. I define what is
properly perceived by sense as irreducibly phenomenal, wholly
perceptible qualities that “would have been perceived if that
same sense had then been first conferred on us”, and things
that are properly perceived are perceived by only one sense.
Colors/light are thus the only proper objects of vision, sounds
of hearing, tastes of the palate, odors of smell, and heat/
hardness/solidity of touch. Proper objects of the senses are
also immediately perceived by the senses, and by immediately
perceived by the senses I mean perceived without being
perceived via suggestion, and without being inferred to exist.
Something is perceived via suggestion if we perceive it in virtue
of it having some habitual connection grounded on experience
with something we immediately perceive. For example, upon
immediately hearing the word “red”, the color red may present
itself to our imagination. But, the color red is not perceived
immediately by hearing, rather it is mediately apprehended
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in virtue of the word we immediately hear, which we’ve come
to associate with the visual color red through experience.
Whatever is perceived via suggestion from wholly perceptible
qualities which we immediately perceive by sense I define
as mediately perceived. What we properly and immediately
perceive by the senses can suggest notions (like emotions, truth,
God, mind, and virtue) which though we’ve never properly
and immediately perceived them, we have an understanding
of what they are in virtue of their definitions or use in linguistic
convention. Otherwise, what we properly and immediately
perceive can suggest something we have previously properly and
immediately perceived by the senses (like a sound or color), to the
imagination- which is where all sensible things are representeddue to a frequently experienced connection between sensible
qualities and notions, or between sensible qualities and other
sensible qualities.
From that which we properly and immediately perceive
by the senses, we can infer the cause of our sensible qualities
through the use of reason. Thus for a direct and indirect realist,
they will infer that a material object is the cause of their sensible
qualities, while for an ideal realist, they will infer some mind
is the cause of their sensible qualities. The sensible qualities
previously properly and immediately perceived by sense that
are suggested to the imagination by current proper objects
of the sense can be termed improper objects of the sense.
Those improper objects of the sense are mediately perceived
by sense. When we properly perceive or hear the word ‘red’
by sound, it may suggest to the imagination an improper
object of sound which is some visual quality we term as red,
though the proper object of sound is strictly what is properly
and immediately heard. In like manner, when we see fire, in
strictness we properly and immediately perceive only colors,
the heat we associate with the fire is suggested to our mind
through experience. Thus, the hotness of the fire is an improper
object of sight, being only suggested to the imagination through
experience, and is a proper object of touch, being felt only
properly, and immediately by sense. Things that are perceived
wholly by the imagination, being not suggested or inferred
to exist, are immediately perceived by the imagination. For
example, when I imagine a red balloon existing in front of
my face, it is not suggested or inferred to exist, and is thus
immediately perceived, not be sense, but by the imagination.
Physical objects must be defined such that it is agreeable
to all three views regarding the philosophy of perception.
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The term ‘physical object’ are often conflated with ‘material
object’, and even often are discussed hand-in-hand: “while
‘physicalism’ is no doubt related to ‘physics’ it is also related
to ‘physical object’ and this in turn is very closely connected
with ‘material object’, and via that, with ‘matter.’” My definition
of physical objects involves two important parts. First,
physical objects occupy the area of extended space perceived
immediately by sense. Second, the existence of physical objects
are not ontologically dependent on the existence of other
physical objects.
Physical objects occupy the mediate area of extended
space perceived by sense, and their existence is not
ontologically dependent on the existence of other physical
objects for indirect realists. Sense data occupy the immediate
area of extended space perceived by sense for indirect realists,
but their existence is ontologically dependent on the existence
of physical objects, and thus sense data are not physical objects.
Physical objects occupy the immediate area of extended space
perceived by sense, and their existence is not ontologically
dependent on the existence of other physical objects for direct
realists and ideal realists. For an ideal realist, however, the
existence of physical objects is ontologically dependent on the
existence of minds. It should be noted that objects perceived
by the imagination are not perceived by sense, thus though I
can imagine a red balloon occupying the visual space in front
of me, it is perceived wholly by the imagination. I think it will
be agreed upon on all hands that this is a neutrally acceptable
definition of ‘physical objects’.
Direct Realism
Direct realists believe that mind-independent physical
objects or material objects are sometimes perceived by sense. In
saying that material objects are sometimes perceived by sense,
direct realists are committed to saying that material objects are
then perceived properly, and immediately. When direct realists
properly and immediately perceive a material object, they say
that the material object appears, seems, or looks, sounds, tastes,
smells, or feels a certain way to a certain person. For example,
when a direct realist perceives an apple, they will say that they
see a material object that looks round, and red. This apple, as it
is in itself or objectively, can exist unperceived by any mind.
The direct realist however cannot say that they perceive
an apple that is round and is red without being only arbitrary.
Without an appeal to reason, there is no non-arbitrary way to
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claim that the senses provide us with anything but mutually
incompatible accounts of some property of a physical object.
The way an object looks is relative to a perceiver and thus any
way the object looks has just as good a right to be considered
the real way the material object is as any other way the object
looks. But this would be absurd, a determinate and unchanging
material object cannot be composed of mutually incompatible
properties. If any way the material object appears to us is the
presentation of the objective material object, we could only
be mediately aware of it because we have to reason which
immediately perceived appearance can exist independently of
a perceiver. But, as direct realists are committed to the claim
that they perceive material objects without inference, they
cannot claim a material object is a certain way only by sense,
because it would entail an appeal to reason or an inference, or
else would be only arbitrary. Thus, direct realists believe that
they perceive material objects by sense which appear a certain
way to them, but they do not know how the material object is
in itself objectively, when unperceived. And, whatever criterion
the direct realist appealed to for ascertaining the true qualities
of the physical object could itself be challenged, for whatever
reason one person gives seems no better than the criterion
another gives. After all, we cannot discern whose unique
perceptual apparatus is right for ascertaining the real qualities
of an object, which object would appear different to everybody.
The existence of hallucinations seems to present a
significant challenge to anyone grappling with the philosophy
of perception. In hallucination, what is immediately perceived
is not a mind-independent physical object. If you were to take
a hallucinogenic drug such as LSD, you could hallucinate
a pink elephant existing in your visual field. Now, if I was
suddenly bestowed with your precise perceptual faculties
and perceptual position, perhaps because our brains/minds
were placed in each other’s bodies, I would not experience
pink elephants existing in my/your visual field, for I had not
taken LSD. Thus, when we hallucinate, what we are aware of
is not a mind-independent physical object. What we are aware
of is something that is mind-dependent, being not perceived
by sense, but wholly by the imagination. What we are aware
of is then not a physical object because it does not exist in
space. Given that we are direct realists, our hallucinations
are therefore representations of mind-independent physical
objects. Therefore, for direct realists, when hallucinations
occur, what we are aware of are mind-dependent non-physical
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representations of mind-independent physical objects which are
perceived by the imagination.
This is similar to the definition of sense data I gave in
paragraph one, but subtly and importantly different. Sense data
are immediately perceived by sense; however, hallucinations
are not perceived by sense, they are perceived wholly by
the imagination, and are thus immediately perceived by the
imagination. Sense data are representations of a physical object
existing in some relationship with their correlative sense data.
The hallucinations we experience would not stand in such a
relationship, the pink elephant I see while hallucinating is not a
mental representation of a pink elephant existing roughly in the
place I seem to see it. It seems therefore, that assuming direct
realism is true, the existence of hallucinations is something like
a purely mental image. When we use our imagination to picture
a blue rectangle, there is a mental image that is a blue rectangle
immediately perceived by the imagination. This is what a direct
realist can say happens in cases of hallucination, we perceive
mental images just like we do in any direct application of
the imagination, except that it is not due to our own volition
that the mental images in hallucinations appear to us, like the
occurrence of mental images normally is. Rather, the application
of our imagination during hallucinations is something similar to
the unconscious application of our imagination in our dreams.
Although the existence of hallucinations does not force
the direct realist to accept the existence of sense data, like
many philosophers have thought in the past, the existence of
hallucinations provides a significant epistemological challenge
for the direct realist. As Dicker put it, “the Argument from
Hallucination… should not be regarded as an attempt to
demonstrate that there are sense-data… the argument should
be regarded as yet another way of calling attention… to…
an epistemological problem concerning perception.” The
problem becomes evident if we accept direct realism as true,
for, anytime we perceive something, I ask, can we ever know
if that thing is not mind-dependent? If we sometimes perceive
things that are mind-dependent mental images, but we cannot
distinguish them from anything we perceive in veridical
perception without an appeal to inference, then we can never
know that we perceive material objects, or something that is
not wholly dependent on our mind. Further, if direct realism is
true, the streamlined argument from perceptual relativity that I
presented shows that whenever we do perceive material objects,
we do not know how they are in themselves or objectively, but
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rather, some object with we know not what qualities appears a
certain way to us. It would seem therefore, that we never know
if or when we perceive mind independent objects, due to the
existence of hallucinations, and even if we did, we would not
know what they were like, due to the existence of perceptual
relativity. Thus, although direct realism is not metaphysically
inconsistent, its holder is plunged into perhaps the deepest
epistemic skepticism imaginable.
Indirect Realism
Indirect realists believe that mind-independent physical
objects or material objects are perceived mediately by sense,
while only mind-dependent non-physical representations
of these physical objects termed sense data are immediately
perceived by sense. In saying that physical objects are
not perceived immediately by sense, the indirect realist is
committed to saying that material objects are justifiably inferred
to exist from the sense data they perceive immediately. The
supposition of sense data is supposed to help deal with the
epistemological challenges presented to the direct realist. And,
the supposition of the existence of mind-independent physical
objects is supposed to make the existence of the immediate
objects of perception (i.e. sense datum) more probable. An
indirect realist will often infer the existence of physical objects
in the likeness of the sense data they perceive immediately by
sense to help explain the existence of the immediate objects of
sense perception. When an indirect realist perceives an apple,
they will often say that they see a sense datum that is round,
and red, and which consequently gives them reason to suppose
that there is a physical apple which is round, and red, that we
perceive indirectly, insofar as it resembles its correlative sense
datum. This apple, as it is in itself, or objectively, can exist
unperceived by any mind, however the sense data cannot, as
sense data exist necessarily in an object-perceiver relationship.
In saying that the sense datum is round, and red, the
indirect realist is not being only arbitrary, for the way that
sense data seem to us is the way that they are. The indirect
realist accepts the principle that “if X appears F to S, and F is
an irreducibly phenomenal, wholly perceptible quality, then S
immediately perceives a sense datum that is F.” Thus, since the
apple appears or looks round and red, and since roundness and
redness are properly perceived, and because the only things
that are properly perceived are irreducibly phenomenal, wholly
perceptible qualities, the sense datum actually is round and red.
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However, in saying that the physical object or apple is round,
and red, the indirect realist is not being only arbitrary, as the
indirect realist is making an inference. The indirect realist is
reasoning that the physical object is like the sense datum which
they perceive immediately by sense. However, the indirect
realist is fallible in their conjecture because they do not know
how the physical object is with certainty. They can only make
an educated guess as to how the material object is in itself; but
since they are not immediately aware of the physical object,
they can never know how the object is in itself. Thus, like the
direct realist, whatever criteria the indirect realist gives could
itself be challenged.
The existence of hallucinations presents a challenge to
indirect realists, though it is less so a problem for the indirect
realist than to a direct realist. What we are aware of in a
hallucination is not a physical object because it does not exist
in space. However, what we are aware of in hallucinations can
be phenomenally indistinguishable from what we perceive in
veridical perception. Thus, for indirect realists, without the
application of reason it seems we cannot distinguish between
whether we are perceiving a sense datum which represents
a physical object by sense, or rather a hallucinatory image,
which for an indirect realist I will call a mental image. I call
it a mental image instead of a regular sense data because it is
perceived wholly by the imagination, and not by sense. There
are some who would call the objects perceived in hallucinations
sense datum, but the term ‘sense datum’ implies that there is
a physical object which is mediately perceived when a sense
datum is perceived. However, during hallucination, like while
in a dream, no physical object is perceived at all; ergo to call the
object of perception in hallucination a sense datum would be
erroneous. I therefore conclude that the object of hallucinatory
perception is merely a mental image.
The indirect realist has the advantage over the direct
realist with regards to the existence of hallucinations because
when indirect realists perceive something immediately, they
can be sure that they are perceiving something immediately
that is mind-dependent. The direct realist cannot know if
they are perceiving something that is mind-dependent, or
mind-independent immediately by sense, for they know
not if they are perceiving either a physical/material object,
or a mental image. The indirect realist, conversely, knows
that they immediately perceive either a sense datum, or a
mental image, both of which are dependent on the mind of the
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perceiver. Unfortunately for the indirect realist, the existence of
hallucinations still provides a difficult epistemic challenge that
they must overcome. Whenever an indirect realist perceives,
they can never know whether they perceive a physical object
indirectly or not. Although the indirect realist knows the object
of immediate perception is mind-dependent, and is in this sense
in an epistemically privileged position in relation to a direct
realist, they know not if there is really an object of mediate
perception, i.e. a physical object in its place, wherever that may
be.
The indirect realist is, like the direct realist, bogged
with at least two severe, epistemic, perceptual problems. In the
first place, the indirect realist can never know whether they are
perceiving a physical, material object or not due to the existence
of hallucinations. Although the indirect realist can be certain
that the direct or immediate object of perception will always be
mind-dependent, they can never know if they perceive an object
that exists independently of sense perception or not. Secondly,
even if the indirect realism was true and we could sometimes
infer the existence of material objects we perceive mediately,
we could never know with certainty what the physical object
looked like.
Berkeley also pointed out that an indirect realist does
not know how mind-independent (material) objects could
produce mind-dependent qualities (sense datum). Neither do
we know how material objects could act upon mind, nor do we
know how a mind-independent object could imprint a sense
datum on our mind, especially if the sense datum is not like
the object. Further, we would have the same reason to believe a
material object exists whether it did or not, as is evident by the
existence of hallucinations or dreams. It seems therefore, that
the existence of sensible qualities is not better explained by the
existence of mediately perceived material objects, because an
indirect realist does not know how a material object could cause
sense data. The problems of perception and mind seem to make
indirect realism epistemically unattractive.
Ideal Realism
Ideal realists believe that everything that is perceived
are ideas, which exist only in the mind. I define ideas as
irreducibly phenomenal, wholly perceptible, mind-dependent
qualities. Ideas are perfectly known, as they contain nothing
in them besides for how they appear to our mind. However,
there are two types of ideas, being mind-dependent physical
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objects termed ‘sensations’ or ‘real things’ which are perceived
by sense, and mind-dependent non-physical representations
of mind-dependent physical objects termed ‘thoughts’ or
‘images of things’, or ‘mental images’ which are perceived
by the imagination. Sensations or real things are properly
and immediately perceived, being imprinted on the senses.
Thoughts or images of things are either immediately, or
mediately perceived, being perceived mediately by the senses
or immediately by the imagination. When thoughts are
suggested to the imagination by sensations which are properly
and immediately perceived, they are mediately and improperly
perceived by sense, and represented by the imagination.
When thoughts are not suggested to the imagination, but are
perceived wholly by the imagination, they are immediately
perceived by the imagination, being not suggested or inferred
to exist. Thus, when an ideal realist perceives an apple, they will
say that they see a sensation or physical object that is round,
and red. This apple, as it is in itself, or objectively, cannot exist
unperceived by any mind.
In saying that the apple is round, and red, the ideal
realist is not being arbitrary. The way that physical objects
appear for ideal realists is the way that they are. The ideal
realist accepts the principle that “if X appears F to S, and F is
an irreducibly phenomenal, wholly perceptible quality, then
S immediately perceives a sensation that is F.” Thus, since the
apple appears or looks round and red, and since roundness
and redness are properly perceived, and because the only
things that are properly perceived are irreducibly phenomenal,
wholly perceptible qualities, the apple actually is round and
red. Ideal realists therefore believe that they perceive sensations
by sense which appear a certain way to them, and this is
how the physical object is in itself or objectively, because all
physical objects are the way that they appear to us. Thus, for
an ideal realist, there is no problem of perceptual relativity, for
everything that is perceived is an idea that is a certain way,
unlike a direct realist who can never tell when they perceive
the true qualities of the object, and unlike an indirect realist
who can never tell to what extent, or even if their sense data
resembles its correspondent object.
The existence of hallucinations presents an epistemic
challenge to ideal realists similar to the indirect realist, but
it is less significant of a problem for ideal realists than it is
for the indirect or the direct realist. What we are aware of in
hallucinations is not a physical object because it does not exist
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in immediate extended space. However, what we are aware
of in hallucinations are phenomenally indistinguishable from
what we perceive in veridical perception. Thus, for ideal
realists, without the application of fallible reason, it seems
we cannot distinguish between whether we are perceiving a
physical object or sensation by sense, or rather a hallucinatory
thought by the imagination.
Like the indirect realist, the ideal realist can always
know that the immediate object of perception is minddependent. However, the existence of hallucinations is less
of a problem for the ideal realist than for the direct and
indirect realists because direct and indirect realists can never
be sure if they perceive something that can exist wholly
unperceived at all. When a hallucinogenic sensible quality
is perceived, something that is exclusively mind-dependent
is perceived, as opposed to in veridical perception. But
sometimes hallucinations are phenomenally indistinguishable
from veridical perception. Thus, direct and indirect realists
could never know if they perceive something that can exist
wholly unperceived, regardless of it being perceived directly
or indirectly. However, for ideal realists, they can always be
sure that they perceive nothing that is mind independent, for
ideal realists only perceive ideas, and ideas are wholly mind
dependent qualities. And, although ideal realists may have
difficulty distinguishing sensations from thoughts without the
use of reason, they still know that however they are appeared
to by ideas is how that idea really is, for the existence of an idea
consists wholly in its being perceived.
Conclusion
Although the existence of hallucinations provides an
epistemic challenge to ideal realists, it is negligible compared
to the epistemic challenge it provides to direct and indirect
realists. Further, the epistemic challenge provided by the
existence of perceptual relativity makes direct and indirect
realism look further unattractive. That is because direct and
indirect realists can never know how physical objects really
are, even if and when they are perceived. This same point does
not apply to ideal realists, who are aware of the way physical
objects are when they are perceived. There is thus no problem
of perceptual relativity for an ideal realist, for their ideas
are perfectly known. Lastly, indirect realists have epistemic
concerns regarding the mind body problem that appear
impossibly to remedy. I conclude my essay by saying that if we
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look at the facts, ideal realism provides the most consistent and
least paradoxical view regarding epistemic knowledge and the
philosophy of perception, and as such should be considered
more likely true.
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